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RECENT CASES
tween the grantor-grantee, all fixtures whether actually or constructively an-
nexed to the property, pass with the conveyance of the realty. 6 Adaption
refers to the purpose of the fixture in the use and occupancy of the land.
7
The intention of the owner is construed to be the controlling element when
determining what charter the chattel has assumed. s Intent may be inferred
from the nature of the article, 9 or the relation and conduct of the party mak-
ing the annexation, i. e., mortgagor-mortgagee, vendor-vendee, landlord-ten-
ant.' 0 The intention of the party does not have to be that the annexation be
forever, rather it may be continuous until the article is worn out, or the owners
purpose has been accomplished."
The absence of an agreement between the parties will allow a landowner
to claim the fixtures in North Dakota. 12 The statute is construed liberally and
it appears that anything constructively annexed to the realty will qualify as a
fixture unless a different intent can be shown by the parties.
Damages may be recovered for the wrongful removal of a fixture from prop-
erty. Consideration must be given to the actual damage sustained,13 the value
of the property before and after the removal,14 the extent of depreciation, and
the replacement cost of the fixture. 15 As a general test cannot be applied to
every case, an evaluation of these tests will enable the court to determine what
a reasonable value should be and aid them in giving judgment accordingly.
ROBERT D. HARTL.
TORTs - PRENATAL INJURY - RIGHT OF ACTION TO VARIABLE FETUS LATER
BORN A MONGOLOID.* - An action was brought on behalf of a child, who alleg-
edly was born mongoloid as a result of injuries received in an automobile
collision when the child was a fetus of age one month. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held, one Justice dissenting, that the child did have a right of
action against the defendant, those automobile allegedly negligently struck the
6. Slater v. Dowd, 79 Ga. App. 272, 53 S.E.2d 598 (1949) (except trade fixtures).
7. Knell v. Morris, 39 Cal.2d 388, 247 P.2d 352 (1952) stated that where innocent
third parties are concerned it is the intent which governs. This however must be reason-
ably manifested by physical facts and outward appearances, rather than any express or
implied intent of those making the annexation. Marty v. Champlin Refining Co., 240 Iowa
325, 36 N.W.2d 360 (1949).
8. Bank of Mulberry v. Hawkins, 178 Ark. 504, 10 S.W.2d 898 (1928); Banner Iron
Works v. Aetna Iron Works, 143 Mo. App. 1, 122 S.W. 762 (1909) stating the principle
criterion is the intention with which the owner of the land or building put the material
into the building or on the land -whether his purpose was to make it permanently a part
of the land or tenement. If this was his purpose when he made the annexation, then,
though it is fastened to the freehold only slightly, and may be displaced without injury
to the freehold, it usually will be treated as a fixture.
9. See In re Slum Clearance, City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 485, 52 N.W.2d 195 (1952);
Strain v. Green, 25 Wash.2d 692, 172 P.2d 216 (1946).
10. Dermer v. Faunce, 191 Md. 495, 62 A.2d 304, aff'd 62 A.2d 582 (1948); see
City of Phoenix v. Linsenmeyer, 78 Ariz. 378, 280 P.2d 698 (1955); Nelse Mortensen &
Co. v. Treadwell, 217 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1954).
11. Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Co-op., 117 Mont. 467, 161 P.2d 526 (1945).
12. Gussner v. Mandan Creamery & Produce Co., 78 N.D. 594, 51 N.W.2d 352 (1952).
13. Fine v. Beck, 140 Md. 317, 117 Ati. 754 (1922); MeMohon v. City of Dubuque,
107 Iowa 62, 77 N.W. 517 (1898).
14. Dwight v. Elmira, C. & N. R.R., 132 N.Y. 199, 30 N.E. 398 (1892) recognizing
two elements of damage: (1) The value of the articles after separation from the freehold;
(2) damage to the realty, if any, caused by removal.
15. Slane v. Curtis, 41 Wyo. 402, 286 Pac. 372 (1930).
* ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The writer is indebted to Dr. E. G. Olmstead, M.D., Asst.
Professor of Medicine and Dr. W. A. Wasdahl, Asst. Professor of Pathology, University of
North Dakota Medical School for their assistance in medical research and opinion.
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automobile driven by the infant's mother. Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93
(Penn. 1960).
The common law rule, which gives no right of action for prenatal injuries
had a dual basis: (1) no duty of care owed to a person not in existence;
and (2) difficulty of proof in reference to causation could lead to a multitude
of fictitious claims.2 The first basis of the rule has been rightly defeated in
several decisions 3 emphasizing the viability theory.4 The second basis could
bring injustices to many plaintiffs and was logically abolished.5 Total obliter-
ation is now evident with recovery being allowed for prenatal injury inflicted
upon the fetus at any time during the period of gestation. 6
The first reported case on prenatal injury is Dietrick v. Inhabitants of
Northhamptan,7 which refused any recovery on grounds that the unborn child
was part of the mother, thus requiring no duty of care to it by the defendant.
This case was taken as authority for an Illinois case8 which held that a sur-
viving child had no cause of action whatsoever for prenatal injuries. In an-
other recent case 9 the court held that in view of varied opinions on causation
of Mongolism no recovery could be granted.
It appears that all of the theories' 0 not based upon genetics omit the well
established difference in chromosome count between the Mongoloid and a
1. "The rule as supported by the numerical weight of authority, is that a child or its
personal representative, in the absence of statute, has no right of action for prenatal in-
juries." Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 I11. 359, 56 N.E. 630 (1900); Dietrick v.
Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884) (Construction of a wrongful death
statute.); Berlin v. J. C. Penny Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); also Restatement
of the Law of Torts § 869 states that a person who negligently causes harm to an unborn
child is not liable to such child for the harm.
2. Prosser, Torts § 36:174 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Cooper v. Blanek, 39 So.2d 352, (La. App. 1923); Kline v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D&C
227 (1924); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334
(1949).
4. An unborn viable child is capable of independent existence, hence should be re-
garded as a separate entity. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923); Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio
St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Woods v. Lancett, 303 N.Y. Supp. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691
(1951); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
"Viable - Capable of living; especially said of a fetus that has reached such a stage
of development that it can live outside of the uterus." Dorland, American Illustrated
Medical Dictionary 1528 (23rd ed. 1957). "Viability is generally taken to range between
the twenty-sixth and the twenty-eighth week of fetal life." Grandwohl, Legal Medicine
834 (1954); also affirmed by Flaister, Medical Jurisdiction and Toxicology 400 (1953).
5. ". . . the fear that recognition of a right of action in a case of this character will
lead to others brought in, bad faith and present insuperable difficulties of proof should not
influence the decisions of the question. It is to be hoped that the law will keep pace with
science .. ." Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334,
339 (1949).
6. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1953); Hornbuckle v.
Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956)); Bennett v. Hymers, 147
A.2d 108, (N.H. 1958). Logical basis for these decisions: "The embryo is regarded as
an entity from the moment of conception." Keith, Human Embryology & Morphology 23
(1921).
7. Supra note 1.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Co., 8 Wis.2d 343. 99 N.W.2d 163
(1960). "...... When scientific or medical theories or explanations have not crossed the
line and become an accepted medical fact, opinions based thereon are no stronger or con-
vincing than the theories . . . . The opinion is based not on facts but conjecture ....
We conclude there was not sufficient credible proof of causation to sustain any award to
Mary Ann for her condition."
10. "The Journal of Pediatrics", St. Louis, Vol. 56, No. 3, Page 412, Josef Warkany,
M.D., Etiology Of Mongolism (1960).
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normal person." Since the chromosome count is established at fertilization,
the number of chromosomes necessarily remains constant thereafter."
Scientific data suggests that medical proof will ultimately lead to a com-
plete refusal of recovery in the near future for prenatal injury cases allegedly
causing Mongolism. Recovery should have been denied in the instant case.
D. M. DELABARRE.
TRUSTS - SALE AND CONVEYANCE - CONFIRMATION BY COURT OF SALE BY
TRUSTEE. - The defendant trustee received an offer from plaintiff to purchase
certain trust property which trustee was empowered to sell. The trustee ac-
cepted the offer, making the sale subject to the approval of the court. Subse-
quently the trustee received a larger offer and asked the court to set aside
his acceptance and permit him to accept the more substantial offer. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, two justices dissenting, held that an offer or bid
upon trust property accepted subject to the approval of the court will not be
disapproved merely because more money has been offered. The dissenting
justice stated that the courts should have the power to disapprove the sale be-
cause of the inadequacy of price whether such price exceeds the appraised
value or not, if at that time a better offer or purchase exists. In Re Strauss'
Trust Estate, 105 N.W.2d 553 (Wis. 1960).
A trustee authorized to sell trust property is under a duty to exercise the
care and skill of a reasonable and prudent man in procuring a purchaser
price.' The general requirements of such a trustee in procuring a purchaser
for trust property are that he act in good faith, with ordinary and prudent
care to obtain the best terms possible. 2 There are a wide range of views taken
by various jurisdictions concerning judicial discretion and approval by courts
of sales of trust property by the trustee. It has been held fundamental that
fraud or improper dealing will be sufficient grounds to set aside a contract
for sale of trust property,' as will a sale to a trustee for a sum substantially
less than market value.4 On the other hand, courts have also said that mere
inadequacy of price will not ordinarily warrant setting aside a sale,5 nor will
the fact that someone else is later willing to pay more.6 California has held
that where a trustee makes a contract to sell land under a decree subjecting it
11. "It is now well established that the normal chromosome number in humans is 46
and that Mongoloid children have 47 chromosomes." Supra note 10, at 413.
12. This necessarily follows from the entire fertilization process presented in medical
science. Supra note 10.
1. Restatement, Trusts (2d ed.) § 190, comment I, Duty of Care and Skill "Although
the trustee is authorized to sell trust property, he is under a duty to the beneficiary to ex-
ercise such care and skill in making the sale as a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise." N.D. Cent. Code § 59-02-06.
2. Thompson v. Hays, 65 N.M. 255, 11 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1926); Cooper v. Ensor,
270 Ky. 670, 110 S.W.2d 461 (1937); Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197
S.W.2d 70 (1946).3. In re Reichert's Estate, 356 Pa. 269, 51 A.2d 615 (1947); In re Minch's Will, 71
N.W.2d 144 (Ohio 1946); Gaver v. Gaver, 176 Md. 171, 4 A.2d 132 (1939).
4. Waterbury v. Nicol, 207 Ore. 595, 296 P.2d 487 (1956).
5. Boyd v. Smith, 127 Md. 359, 96 Atl. 526 (1916); Straus v. Anderson, 366 111.
426, 9 N.E.2d 205 (1937); American Trading & Production Corp. v. Connor, 109 F.2d
205 (4th Cir. 1940); Cf. Ist Nat. Bank of Waseca v. Paulson, 69 N.D. 512, 288 N.W.
465 (1939) ": . . it must be unreasonable and unfairly inadequate."
6. Gilden v. Harris, 196 Md. 32, 78 A.2d 167 (1951); Cook v. Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. of Baltimore, 172 Md. 398, 191 At. 713 (1937); Cf. Lancaster County v.
Schwartz, 152 Neb. 15, 39 N.W.2d 921 (1949) "Due respect must be given to the right of
the successful bidder and the stability of judicial sales generally."
